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During the COVID-19 pandemic, public attention turned to contact tracing apps as a possible solution to 
the spread of the virus. Many countries have moved in this direction, adopting contact tracing apps, while 
respecting personal data protection and, for EU countries, adhering to a number of fundamental principles: 
voluntariness, interoperability, regulatory coverage, purpose specification, minimisation, transparency, 
protection, security, and timeliness. In spite of timely public policy efforts, tracking apps have not been a 
success in many countries, and today, when their use could be of great importance, it seems appropriate to 
open a reflection on the success and unsuccessfulness of a public policy that has resolutely supported the 
use of digital technologies for public utility purposes. 
This working paper proposes a comparative analysis of nine OECD countries: Australia, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, Spain. It outlines the specific factors in each 
country's public policy that made the use of tracking apps possible, in terms of policy design with respect 
to: objectives, instruments, public procurement selection criteria, resources and the context in which the 
policy was implemented. The working paper concludes with three lessons learned from the comparative 
analysis: the privacy paradox, the choice of a public interest technology, and the systemic interweaving that 
the implementation of a public policy must take into account to enhance the effectiveness of a public interest 
action. 
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1. Introduction and context  
During the COVID-19 pandemic, public attention turned to contact tracing apps as a 
possible solution in collecting and using information to contain the spread of infections (WHO 
2020). The interest aroused by the success in some countries - Singapore (OPSI 2020) and South 
Korea, in particular (Shendruk 2020) - has promptly fueled the expectation in other countries that 
an effective solution essentially required an appropriate technology, a population willing to be 
tracked and a public policy that activated tracing as an integrated program in the contagion 
containment plan. That things were more complicated than expected was observed by various 
authors as early as the summer of 2020. Among them, Sander van der Leeuw (van der Leeuw 
2020) opens to the general theme of information in addressing measures to contain the pandemic; 
a contribution proposed by Maria Savona (Savona 2020) highlights, on the one hand, the 
criticality inherent in the very idea of a technological solution for the collection of infectious 
tracking information without a social context aligned to the solution, and, on the other hand, the 
need to open a critical discussion on the main technological players involved in the development 
and use of tracking apps, Apple and Google. 
The analysis of the problems related to the adoption of contact tracing apps offers a 
framework of considerable interest on the innovation policy to combat COVID-19 and the related 
critical issues, even more so today, in which countries with the higher vaccination rate are starting 
to contain the spread of the infection, with tracking apps that will be able to identify and contain 
specific outbreaks.  
The opportunity to resort to the use of tracing systems to stop the spread of secondary 
infections has fully entered the scientific as well as the media debate, leading many countries to 
commit themselves to their adoption. According to Bending Spoons, which developed the Immuni 
app adopted by Italy (Immuni 2021), there have been numerous questions raised by citizens with 
regard to privacy, an issue that was immediately grasped within the European Union, by the 
European Data Protection Board (EDPB 2020), which promptly highlighted the need to field 
"modern techniques" for the fight against COVID- 19 "in the interest of humanity", warning, at 
the same time, on the necessary respect, even in emergency contexts, of all human rights, not least 
those related to the sphere of individual privacy, expressly protected by the same Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (articles 7, 8 and 52) (European Union 2016). It was, 
moreover, on this basis and in consideration of the other specific European disciplines on the 
protection of personal data, that the fundamental principles to which the Member States should 
have complied with were first identified and then better specified: voluntariness, interoperability, 
regulatory coverage, clarification of the purposes, minimization, transparency, protection, 
security, temporariness.  
In this paper we build on these premises and, in addition to what has already been discussed 
in other works (see, in particular, Savona 2020), we focus on the relevant dimensions in enhancing 
the success of a public policy that supports the use of contagion tracking apps. The case study on 
this STI policy concerns a significant innovation, not so much for the specific technical solutions 
proposed by developers in the various countries, but for the objective of their use - accelerated in 
a period of a few months - and for large-scale adoption for public utility purposes.  
The essay offers a comparative analysis on innovation policies supporting the adoption of 
contact tracing apps in nine OECD countries: Australia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, New 
Zealand, Russia, South Korea, Spain. To contextualize the dynamics of adoption of tracking apps 
(download and use) and to enhance the potential that these technologies will have in the next 
phases of containment of the pandemic, it is appropriate to consider the changed scenario of the 
spread of infections, made possible, initially, by the practices of containment of social interactions 
that limited mobility and economic and social activities, and by the administration of vaccines.  
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the sources of information and 
data used in the comparative analysis. Section 3 describes the main features of the contact tracking 
apps that characterize the nine countries. Section 4 outlines a longitudinal cross-country 
perspective on the changes occurred during the pandemic. Section 5 concludes with three main 
lessons learned from the comparative analysis and with possible developments in the analysis.  
2. Information and Data Sources 
The comparative analysis refers to France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, among the countries 
in Europe most affected by the virus, to the Republic of Ireland, which has created one of the best 
tracking programs in Europe. Australia, South Korea, New Zealand, and Russia have been 
identified as a reference to non-European countries which have used different systems and 
methods for tracking, with far from unanimous opinions. The countries considered in this 
comparative analysis allow us to have a first reference framework of the determinants and specific 
social and institutional features that have characterized the European and non-European context 
in the use of a contact tracing technology to contain the spread of the pandemic contagion. 
COVID-19. Cross-country comparison of the implementation of the contact tracing apps refers to 
countries with different economic and demographic characteristics that may have affected the 
capacity and speed of response to the emergency healthcare: the size of the countries, the resident 
population, the growth rates of GDP, and the deficit of the individual countries may have been a 
source of limiting or facilitating the effectiveness and speed of fighting the pandemic.  
With respect to contact tracing apps we focus on their technological features and the 
following aspects: when and who developed it, on behalf of whom, where (place and 
company/startup/ research center), if and how much public funding it has received; when the app 
came into operation, data on its use, public information and advertising campaigns on its use, 
institutional statements.  
For each country, beyond specific sources of information, we integrate two main data 
sources: Norton Rose Fulbright (2021) and the public database Covid Tracing Tracker, created 
by O'Neill, Ryan-Mosley, and Johnson (2020), available on the MIT Technology Review website. 
Norton Rose Fulbright (2021) allows us to consider some of the countries analyzed in our 
work - Australia, France, Germany, Russia - regarding three areas: how the government of each 
country has acted to monitor and control the spread of the virus through the use of tracking 
technology; the main problems related to the use of this technology; a detailed description of the 
main contagion tracking apps. With reference to Australia and Germany, we integrated the 
information - on the characteristics of the technological platforms used and on the policy decisions 
- drawing on De Michele (De Michele 2020). Other sources were also scrutinized for a broader 
picture of South Korea, New Zealand, the Republic of Ireland, and Spain.  
As for the Covid Tracing Tracker, the main motivation that prompted the US media 
company to undertake the project of public collection of information on contact tracing lies in the 
vast proliferation of apps available globally as a result of the pandemic and its relative difficulty. 
of finding comprehensive official information about their applications. To build the database, 
O'Neill, Ryan-Mosley, and Johnson (2020) used government sources, news outlets, and 
interviews directly with application developers to understand the technologies and policies 
involved1. Although it provides useful information for international comparisons, the database 
 
1 For each country, in addition to the name of the tracking app used, the following information is shown: who are the 
developers, the number of users, the penetration and the target of penetration of the app in terms of percentage of 
users on the total population , the type of technology used, whether or not citizens have the right to choose about the 
use of the applications, if there are limitations on how the data is used, if the data will be destroyed after a certain 
period of time, if the app collects only the information it needs to operate efficiently or if it collects additional 
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Covid Tracing Tracker does not cover information on South Korea, Russia, and Spain.  
Detailed information by country is available in Annex 1. 
3. Contact tracking apps used in nine countries 
How contact tracing apps work  
Contact tracing apps differ primarily in information management. The centralized" type 
apps (PEPP-PT type) in which the data are consolidated in a system and removed from the 
peripheral devices, is contrasted by the technological infrastructure developed and made available 
jointly by Apple and Google (A/G platform) in which repositories and data retention are managed 
by the same smartphones, according to a solution considered "decentralized" (DP-3T and A/G 
solution), in which all or almost all of the data remains on personal devices2.  
Concerning the tracking technologies and information management, we found that 
Australia, France, South Korea, and New Zealand have adopted apps that use different data 
transmission technologies (Bluetooth, Google/Apple, QR codes), but all with centralized 
information management; Germany, Ireland, Italy and Spain have instead chosen technologies 
with Bluetooth data transmission and Google/Apple protocol with decentralized data 
management; no information was found on the technology of the app adopted in Russia.  
Who are the developers? Identikit of a competence network  
Overall, the development of tracking apps has put in place a network of skills that embraces 
software developers (both the giants of the caliber of SAP and small companies such as Webtek), 
telecommunications companies (such as Orange, in France, and Deutsche Telekom, in Germany), 
academic researchers working in many fields, university spin-offs and civic hackers. In the world 
of software developers, new skills are pooled around young developers, with high international 
mobility, as in the case of Bending Spoons (developer of Immuni, in Italy). In the field of 
academic research, consortia have been created for the development of strategic research alliances 
with private companies. In some cases, the app has been designed for non-profit purposes 
(Australia and Italy), while in the other cases it is a public contract, even if the terms of the 
contracts are not easily available. 
Comparative analysis of the implementation of policies for the use of infection tracking apps 
In addition to the technologies that characterize the tracking apps used by the nine 
countries, the comparison proposed in this work covers four main dimensions of the policy 
implementation of the tracking apps.  
(a) Selection of the app, resources, management, and regulation about the information collected 
Implementing the Tracking App Policy is primarily concerned with how the app is selected. 
The Italian government has launched an open call. Governments in France, Germany, and Ireland 
have the company or coalition of companies in charge of development. The public resources 
invested for their use and maintenance are clearly identifiable only for Germany. For the other 
countries, we have not been able to trace the information. 
Using the categories proposed by O'Neill, Ryan-Mosley, and Johnson (2020), the policies 
associated with the use of apps have been classified according to five main characteristics of 
management and regulation of the information. With the exception of South Korea and Russia, 
the comparative results highlight that: all the apps require a user's explicit permission and a person 
can choose not to use it without negative effects; policies are in place to ensure that tracking does 
 
information to what is stated, if the user's true identity is anonymized or not, if a decentralized or centralized 
architecture is adopted and, finally, whether the application has been launched or not. 




not survive specific use to combat COVID-19; technology and policies ensure that data is deleted 
when it is no longer needed for public health purposes; user identification is masked or 
anonymized; policies exist to ensure that only necessary information is collected; sharing data 
with external entities is prohibited; government and technology are transparent about what data 
is acquired, from where, how it is used and who has access to it. 
(b) Integration of the information collected 
Regarding the integration between the information collected with the tracking app and the 
health system, we did not find information relating to France, Germany, Ireland, and Spain. We 
have found that in Australia and Italy there is an integration with the local health system, while 
in New Zealand, Russia and South Korea, the central government manages the information 
directly, also in concert with the health authorities. The levels of integration, where present, are 
considered poorly or poorly integrated. 
(c) Communication and information campaign  
Regarding the characteristics of the information campaigns implemented in the nine 
countries, we currently have found information only about Italy. The campaign had the following 
objectives: to promote the use of Immuni and contribute to the increase of downloads; inform 
people about the functioning of Immuni, about its usefulness, safety, reliability; promote a sense 
of personal responsibility and belonging to the national community. Promoted on TV, press, radio, 
and social media, the campaign lasted four months, divided into three phases: the launch in June, 
a maintenance phase in July / August and early September, and the third recall at the start of 
autumn. The coordination of the campaign, both for creativity and planning, was handled by 
Publicis Groupe (a French multinational also based in Italy), which made teams and resources 
available completely free of charge, coordinating a real alliance among the media involving Rai, 
Mediaset, Sky, Apple, Google, Facebook, Mondadori, ItaliaOnline, Il Messaggero, RCS, Gedi 
Group, public figures, startups, companies. The continuity of the information campaign failed 
precisely in the acceleration phase of the infections, in autumn 2020, in a context in which the 
opposition parties of the Government declared themselves opposed to "Immuni" or simply 
claimed they would not download it, while the parliamentarians of the ruling coalition (and Forza 
Italia) were instead generally in favor, and some of them showed that they had downloaded and 
activated it on their smartphone, inviting everyone to do so.  
(d) The citizens' response 
The response of citizens of different countries to the use of tracking apps can be 
summarized by the data available in the database by O'Neill, Ryan-Mosley, and Johnson (2020): 
the percentage of use concerns about 26.6% of the population in Australia, 26.3% in Ireland, 
21.7% in Germany, around 16.2% in Italy and just 3.3% in France. For South Korea, New 
Zealand, Russia, and Spain, data is not available.  
4. A longitudinal perspective: December 2019 - June 2021 
The WHO announcement of the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic was accompanied by 
strategic indications on the containment of infections: hygiene rules, social distancing (then 
implemented through lockdown measures of entire cities, regions, countries), tests of diagnostics, 
therapies aimed at contrasting acute manifestations, development of medical technologies for 
assisted breathing have appeared in many of the countries affected by the pandemic at different 
times as the intensity of the phenomenon increased. Vaccine research was the field of action on 
which many specific resources were concentrated in countries that had research capacities and 
production centers of the pharmaceutical industries. The international scientific community has 
achieved unthinkable results under normal conditions. Suffice it to say that in tackling the race 
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against the pandemic, an open-access collection of documents relating to the COVID-19 virus 
and online interrogation tools for digital documents in text format was created from scratch (Lu 
Wang et al. 2020).3 The American medical library launched in March 2020 the largest open-
access initiative ever, involving researchers from all countries. Significant publishers of scientific 
journals have signed an agreement to share their publications in text format, Google provided the 
query platform and developed the text query algorithms. In two months, the scientific community 
had access to the information already available with ad hoc interrogation tools: an unprecedented 
collaborative effort that supported the intensification of the activity of scientists in academic 
research laboratories and pharmaceutical industries and which had great results in the 
development of vaccines. Just think of the very short time interval between the WHO 
announcement of the start of the COVID-19 epidemic and the start of the Moderna trial, just four 
months later: a record so extraordinary that it can be compared to the moon landing (Sky TG24 
2020). 
Figure 1 shows, for various countries, the series of events that took place from December 
31, 2019 to June 9, 2021. The information collected makes it possible to outline - for the countries 
in question - a longitudinal perspective on the information taken into consideration. The narrative 
unfolds along four themes: general information on the pandemic and the first case declared in 
each of the countries, the lockdowns, the adoption of tracking apps, the launch of the first trial of 
a vaccine against COVID-19, and the initiation of administrations.  
Five phases are evident: the announcement of the pandemic and the reporting of case zero 
(or case 1) in each country are followed by the first series of lockdown decisions. Within a few 
months, all countries launch the use of tracking apps, which, as we have seen, have had a moderate 
or low level of use, and in the third phase the countries all proceed with subsequent lockdowns, 
aimed at containing infections in regions or areas that make it possible to limit the outbreaks. 
A year after the WHO announcement on the new Coronavirus, there are a series of vaccine 
approvals. In the European countries, such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain, The Netherlands, 
and Hungary, 27 December 2020 was chosen as the symbolic date of the first vaccine 
administrations. The United States, Russia, and Israel preceded Europe of a few days: 15, 19 and 
20 December respectively. In February 2021, several countries, such as Australia, Japan, New 
Zealand, South Korea, and Hong Kong, began their vaccination process  
Figure 1 - Activation of the use of contact tracing apps, lockdowns, launch of vaccine trials, general events  
  
Source: Authors' elaboration on various sources4 
 
3 The OECD-WPTIP conference on "Open data and AI analytics in times of COVID-19: the CORD-19 initiative" (30 
November 2020) documented the potential of a change of mindset with respect to open access, particularly in the 
contributions to the conference by Jerry Sheehan (Deputy Director at the National Library of Medicine - National 
Institutes of Health), Kathryn Funk (Program Manager for PubMed Central at the US National Library of Medicine) 
and Sebastian Kohlmeier (Sr. Manager of Program Management and Business Operations at the Allen Institute for 
AI (AI2)). 
4 On line browsing at https://www.tiki-toki.com/timeline/entry/1639555/COVID-19/. Data Source in Annex 2. 
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5. Lessons learned and further developments of the analysis  
The aim of contact tracing apps was outlined by the World Health Organisation (WHO 
2020) as a means to contain contagions. Despite the use of apps in many countries, there seems 
to be no evidence to date that they have had an effect. Even countries such as Iceland, which as 
of 6 October 2020 registered about 40% of citizens (however insufficient) with the application 
downloaded, or Switzerland with its SwissCovid, where more than 1.6 million people use it on a 
population of 8.5 million on the same date. In both countries, tracking showed no performance 
that could be used as a model for the other countries.  
That the effectiveness of tracking is inversely proportional to the number of infections 
seems to be a relevant issue. Now that vaccines are reaching the threshold of herd immunity in 
many Western countries, apps could become useful for tracking the spread of variants of COVID-
19, a condition that calls for attention on the importance of public investments in the use of this 
technology. This explains the relevance of addressing a comparative analysis of which conditions 
would make more effective a STI policy supporting the adoption of contact tracing apps. 
The comparative analysis proposed in the paper suggests that some conditions seem to 
explain the success/failure of those policies. In these concluding remarks, we propose three main 
lessons learned concerning: the privacy paradox, the choice of a technology of public interest, 
and the systemic intertwining of which the implementation of a public policy must take into 
account to enhance the effectiveness of an action of public interest. 
Lesson 1 - The paradox of privacy and the social dimension of technology 
The main similarities between countries are not so much the technical features of the 
applications - often also connected to Apple and Google as seen in Germany, Italy, and Spain - 
rather than in the reception that the population has reserved for such a policy strategy. Distant or 
culturally unrelated countries have encountered similar difficulties on the part of citizens in 
accepting the use of tracking apps, with political interventions that have negatively influenced 
public opinion often even before the apps became downloadable.  
As for the European and non-European countries that we have examined, all countries have 
based the tracking software following a mandatory rule: the right to the maintenance of privacy, 
which in Europe is regulated by the General Data Protection Regulation, and specifically for 
COVID-19 data (EDPB 2020). As obvious as it may seem, it is actually a very strong signal of 
how there is a shared sensitivity in keeping individual movements anonymous. Yet the use of 
social networks, which often have active the location of the mobile phone, or of digital payment 
means to make purchases, which track those activities in precise ways, spatially and temporally, 
is widely widespread today, with no concern on the privacy issue by the majority of individuals. 
So why care so much about privacy of a contact tracing app when our data bounce every day on 
clouds around the world? The explanation seems to us to reside in the different point of view that 
people take in the social media and the market sphere (closely connected), to which as 
users/consumers they seem to rely on without hesitation, and the sphere of the state intervention, 
to which the citizens seem to regard with distrust: it appears as "a privacy paradox". Big 
companies have modeled social media and consumers' confidence, without transparency in their 
actions. Democratic governments, as in Europe, have regulated in a transparent way the privacy 
issue, but have failed to create consensus on collection and use of individual data. Companies use 
information to outline the profile of the social/consumer user aiming at increasing the profits 
deriving from advertising for commercial purposes. The governments could use the information 
to control citizens, knowing what they do and where, even in relation to domains that do not 
concern a pandemic, but other spheres of private life. Although such control can be approved 
when criminals are being controlled, the only idea that everyone could end up under that control 
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widens distrust of tools that offer individual data to the state5.  
An interesting exception to citizens' hesitations over the use of tracking apps seems to be 
the Czech Republic, which has employed "Smart Quarantine", designed by geo-locating credit 
card movements to create "memory maps" with places where an individual has spent their time 
in the past five days, and what contact they have had. Similar thing for Israel that with its "Shield" 
tracks and combines the different positions to then report any quarantines.  
The overall issue is addressed in terms of "democratic compromises and digital 
surveillance" (OECD, 2021), but it would be useful to analyze the privacy paradox in a slightly 
different declination. If we were only rational beings, we would take every measure available to 
preserve ourselves, including using an app that tells us if we have come into contact with positive 
people; what makes us so unwilling to download a contact tracking app necessary to contain the 
spread of the pandemic? We are talking about an app that is born, serves, and is linked to a context 
of strong negative feelings: fear, anger, sadness, anxiety. In the short term, it offers – with respect 
to those basic functionalities - no individual benefit. It is therefore not surprising that the different 
contact tracking apps have turned out to be a little-used tool and viewed with distrust.  
A public policy that invests in tools such as the tracking app to contain contagions should 
therefore accompany public action by creating the conditions to dialogue, inform and build with 
citizens a sense of collective interest on objectives that require, in order to be achieved, a particular 
commitment to individual behavior. Achieving this result requires adequate tools that impact not 
only generically on communication, but also on the participation of citizens in undertaking 
individual decisions for a collective interest, participation that must be nurtured in normal times, 
to be effective even in emergency conditions, a result also demonstrated by the field experiment 
conducted by Pancotto's research group on citizens participation in seismic emergency contexts 
and different social propensities to participate (Pancotto and Righi 2021).  
An alternative way to incentive individual use of a contact tracing up is to limit users' 
freedom of daily life, such as access to shops and malls. Such incentives leverage on the consumer 
sphere. This might have a short term impact but it does not address the necessary shift from 
individual behaviour towards a collective goal: an investment that social institutions (not 
necessarily the state) should foster for the many goals to be achieved, as the UN SDGs, entering 
in the agenda of most countries for the post pandemic recovery. 
The privacy paradox is then not only a matter of regulation; it highlights that the social 
dimension of technology is just as important as the strictly technical dimension. 
Lesson 2 - How do you choose a technology of public interest?  
If the social dimension we discussed above is central in implementing a public policy, so 
too is the technical dimension concerning the competence network it relies on. The substantial 
differences in the tracking apps adopted by the countries examined concern the information 
transmission technology (Bluetooth, QR codes, Google/Apple, GPS) and the information 
collection technology (decentralized or centralized). Countries have adopted different approaches 
 
5 This sensitivity is by no means new. One of the most striking events that caused discussion in this sense 
was the massacre in San Bernardino, California on December 2, 2015, when two people, husband and 
wife, entered the Inland Regional Center, a social center for the disabled, opening the fire killing 14 people 
plus dozens of injured. That event shook the West, not only because of the Islamic matrix, in the United 
States strongly after 9/11, but also because Apple refused to create and deliver to the US Department of 
Justice the software to decrypt the passwords of the mobile phones, with the goal of finding in those 
mobile phones more information on the two criminals. That software would not only have allowed to 
unlock that particular iPhone, but theoretically all of them, making the US government essentially free to 
use the data of about 50% of Americans, plus other users of the Apple brand around the world (Canu 
2020), about 1.5 billion potential devices (Migliorino 2020). 
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in the selection of the apps, both with respect to the technology to be adopted and the network of 
competence to rely on. Australia was the only one of the analyzed countries to use an app 
developed by academic researchers from several internationally renowned institutes, including 
the University of Queensland, Auckland, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the Delft 
University of Technology. The rest of the countries have relied on private companies. France and 
Germany have selected the national reference company for the development of the app, 
respectively, TousAntiCovid was developed with the French telephone operator Orange Sa and 
the French public search system of INRIA, the German Corona-Warn-App was developed by 
SAP and Deutsche Telekom. The Italian government has instead launched a selection open to 
many alternatives, including an app created by Bending Spoons, a mobile phone app development 
company. The Irish government has relied on Near Form in collaboration with Apple and Google. 
Similarly, the Russian government said it used the collaboration of Apple and Google to develop 
the app. In South Korea, New Zealand, and Spain, input from their respective governments was 
essential; while in South Korea, the tracking app Corona 100m was developed by the Ministry of 
the Interior and Security, in New Zealand the Ministry of Health intervened, in Spain the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs and Digital Transformation. 
A public policy that uses data collection and analysis technologies for public purposes, as 
in the case of the data necessary for tracing infections, makes specific choices that orient public 
procurement towards technological solutions that are based on the enhancement of skills that exist 
in the country or that attract skills that exist in other countries. In the current political and 
economic context, in which the technological sovereignty of a country returns as a central element 
of public policies, also in Europe (Edler et al. 2020; Darnis 2020; European Commission 2020; 
VDE 2021), the question of the choice of technology for a public need requires a reflection on the 
choices of creation or consolidation of internal competences in countries, an issue that goes 
beyond the contingency of this pandemic. For example, has Italy the skills of France or Australia, 
and could it have activated them quickly?  
The choice of a technology of public interest, therefore, requires a reflection on what skills 
a country has and on the decisions about which public policies favor the support and development 
of those skills or the creation of new skills. 
Lesson 3 - How important are interconnections for the success / effectiveness of policy 
implementation? 
A public policy that uses data collection and analysis to address an issue of collective 
concern, to be effective in its impact, must outline the relevant direct, and possibly indirect, 
interconnections. 
A first area, which might seem essentially technological, concerns precisely the 
compatibility with the mobile devices necessary for data collection. In various countries, many 
potential users could not use the contact tracking app due to software incompatibilities, such as 
in Portugal, where almost 10% of the population does not have a compatible device with the 
reference app (Adnkronos 2020). A technological development is not the best one if it does not 
take into account the users' characteristics, such as the structure of the population in terms of 
income and propensity to consume digital products. 
Another interconnection concerns an infrastructural aspect: the intertwining between a 
technology - destined to tackle a health problem - and the health system, with which the tracking 
app must enter into dialogue for effective transmission and recording of the data you activate. We 
have not been able to find adequate documentation to develop a reflection on this issue, which we 
intend to deepen with direct interviews with public organizations of the health system in different 
contexts. In Italy, health is a constitutional right, guaranteed by the national health system with 
organizational autonomy on a regional scale. This decentralization impacts in different ways the 
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adoption of an app that is designed regardless of those specificities, including the absorption / 
processing / integration of the collected data for health surveillance. Such an area of reflection 
deserves special attention if the tracking app is to be used in the exit from the pandemic. 
Another issue that impacts on the effectiveness of adopting a technology concerns the 
information campaign: an issue on which we have not been able to find adequate evidence. In 
Italy, the advertising campaign, made possible by the voluntary effort of a large group of private 
actors (both from the media sector and software development) had a modest temporal coverage, 
leaving the field when the difficulties of downloading the app and its functioning would have 
required a specific commitment of information. The theme of public communication, therefore, 
returns as an issue that cannot be separated from the implementation of a policy, intertwining 
success / effectiveness not so much with the technology that has been chosen, but with its 
adoption, which must be supported with specific social actions beyond media. 
Last but not least is the issue of resources allocated to the implementation of the policy. 
The fact that we were only able to find information for Germany may indicate the difficulty of 
accessing that information, which should also be in the public domain. The number of resources 
invested monthly by Germany for the maintenance and development of its tracking app, around 
3 million euros per month (Brady 2020), should make it clear that the digital world has a material 
dimension (of specific goods and services) that often is overlooked by decision-makers: public 
policies that rely on the use and analysis of data do require to invest additional resources once the 
software application has been developed. 
Further research developments  
The comparative analysis between the countries considered has highlighted the different 
institutional and organizational contexts as well as the specific STI policies that have promoted 
the use of contact tracing apps. Broadening the set of countries on which to carry out a 
comparative analysis would be interesting, not only to validate and collect more evidence, but to 
test the analytical framework proposed in the comparative analysis explored in this paper. A 
systemic perspective on the implementation process of a policy needs to address the complexity 
of its multilevel interaction (Geyer & Rihani, 2012; Gray, 2015; Hjern & Porter, 1981; Tenbensel, 
2015). This requires a look from the inside – adopting an ethnographic method (Agar, 1996, 
2006) - being a participant observer (Bobbio et al., 2017; Vino, 2018), elaborating a massive over 
determination pattern of information, highlighting rich points to outline a new framework in 
which the comparative analysis can be interpreted and the policy recommendations become more 
effective.  
In such a development it is essential to carry out interviews with experts and managers of 
the institutions and organizations involved in the development of contagion tracking apps. To 
deepen the technical and operational nature of the tracking apps and their uses and to fill the lack 
of press sources or scientific literature, it is considered appropriate to resort to direct and targeted 
interviews with the representatives of various companies and institutions mentioned in this 
preliminary work by research, also regarding the choices of the advertising campaign relating to 
tracking apps. In the case of Italy, among the possible alternatives to the Immuni app, particular 
interest deserves the analysis of the developments undertaken by the developers of Air - Digital 
Arianna, of the University of Urbino, which would offer a case to analyze if and in what direction 
its development is proceeding in terms of collaborations and what the next objectives will be, as 
well as the application on the tracing of infections. 
With reference to the health system, the interviews would allow to outline the reasons and 
implications of the choices made in the different countries and to understand the functioning of 
the entire process of adopting the tracking app for an effective containment of infections. In Italy, 
in particular, an analytical gap remains to be filled regarding the technological and organizational 
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infrastructures of the regional health systems. In the new phase of contagion containment that will 
be implemented thanks to the spread of vaccines, health infrastructures could derive important 
operational advantages if they were able to effectively integrate the information detected through 
the tracking apps. A comparative analysis of the potential organizational change that the regional 
health systems are planning and that is characterizing the health systems in the countries examined 
may therefore be of great interest.  
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Annex 1 - Tracking apps in Australia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Russia, 
South Korea, Spain 
Australia: Covidsafe  
Source: De Michele 2020; Fiore 2020; Melissari 2020; Norton Rose Fulbright 2021; Wikipedia 2021
Who are the developers 
COVIDSafe, adopted on 1 December 2020, works thanks to 
the "Trace together" software used by Singapore, and is 
connected to a government server and operated by Amazon. 
It is based on the Safe Blues method of estimating and 
controlling infections against COVID-19 which was 
developed by academic researchers from various institutes, 
including the University of Queensland, Auckland, the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Delft 
University of Technology (Safe Blues 2020). 
How it works 
The app is based on Bluetooth technology. COVIDSafe 
periodically issues a unique identifier (ID) that can be picked 
up by the smartphones that use the application, and that are 
nearby. If one of the app users later discovers that they are 
coronavirus positive, they can give consent to health 
authorities to use this information in a centralized online 
registry. COVIDSafe periodically connects to the registry 
and compares the list of IDs reported with those it has 
collected, passing by other smartphones that use the 
application. In case it finds a match, it sends a notification to 
alert the user who can then contact the healthcare staff. The 
ID for each user of the application is provided at the time of 
registration, again through the app. To be able to register, 
you must enter your name and surname, age and postcode of 
the area in which you reside. The app then asks for a mobile 
number to have a unique reference to the user, and to prevent 
individuals from creating multiple IDs, complicating system 
management. You will then receive an SMS with a PIN to be 
entered in the app to confirm your identity. The application 
only collects anonymous IDs issued by nearby smartphones, 
with the time in which it collected the data. The ID and the 
time are two sufficient data to reconstruct a possible contact 
with a person who later tested positive. COVIDSafe 
therefore does not collect geographic information and does 
not use GPS, offering, according to its developers, some 
more guarantees for privacy. 
Data and privacy 
The Australian government has confirmed that it will be 
responsible for managing the online registry, where IDs of 
positive results flow together. The collected data will be 
deleted after 21 days from the first entry. However, the health 
authorities of the individual states (Australia has a federal 
structure) will have access to the information, while this will 
not be made available to law enforcement or other federal 
agencies. The police will not have access even with a warrant 
and the courts will not be able to force the government to 
provide information on individual users. 
France: StopCovid and TousAntiCovid  
Source: Norton Rose Fulbright 2021; Horton Ollia 2020
Who are the developers 
The app was designed by a government-led task force, in 
collaboration with the leading telephone operator Orange 
Sa, the software company Dassault systemes Se, and Inria, 
the French research institute for digital science and 
technology, was publicly launched on 8 April 2020, tested 
until May and then definitively operational from early 
June (Norton Rose Fulbright 2020). France has chosen to 
have its app designed by companies and national bodies.  
How it works 
France has chosen to have its app designed by companies 
and national bodies. Unlike what happened in Italy, 
France, similarly to the United Kingdom, has decided not 
to use the Apple-Google platform in the name of the 
country's digital sovereignty. The French independence in 
choosing the application in the centralized PEPP-PT 
model with data on a server was highlighted, compared to 
other 22 European countries that have chosen the 
decentralized DP-3T model, with the data remaining on 
the phones.  
The StopCovid tracking app does not use geolocation and 
also relies on Bluetooth to notify when a phone is in the 
vicinity of others who have the application and alert in 
relation to any proximity to those who tested positive 
(without revealing their identity). Bluetooth then tracks 
contacts, not where they happened. TousAntiCovid is an 
enriched and interactive version of the first StopCovid 
application. The functionalities remain almost completely 
unchanged, even if the name change brings with it some 
aesthetic tweaks and the introduction of new features such 
as direct access to updated official data about the 
pandemic, links to institutional sites and resources and the 
list of measures to be respected to deal with the 
emergency. TousAntiCovid is an application that allows 
everyone to be an actor in the fight against the epidemic, 
and as already mentioned it has features similar to the 
Italian app and more generally to those of European 
countries, paying particular attention to privacy at the 
expense of efficiency at times. There is greater 
transparency with automatic and regular publication of 
key data, access to DépistageCovid, the updated map of 
screening locations that includes practical information 
such as estimated waiting times. 
Data and privacy 
The application is based on voluntary use and allows the 
traceability of contacts, thanks to the use of Bluetooth 
technology, without resorting to the geolocation of people. 
The collected data will be deleted after 14 days from the 
first entry. The Secretary of State for Digital, Cédric O, 
tried to reassure the population, recalling that geolocation 
(the focal point of much of the controversy on data 
protection related to the Immuni app) will not be used by 
 
 
the French application StopCovid, which the code 
computer (source code) of the app will be completely 
public. In the exceptional context of crisis management, 
the members of the college Commission nationale de l 
'informatique et des libertés CNIL intervened on April 
24, 2020 claiming that the system complies with the 
general data protection regulations (GDPR) if certain 
conditions are met. CNIL noted that a number of 
guarantees are provided by the government plan, notably 
the use of pseudonyms. However, the CNIL requested 
vigilance and stressed that the application can only be 
implemented if its usefulness is sufficiently demonstrated 
and if it is integrated into a global health strategy. Insisting 
on the necessary safety of the device, he made technical 
recommendations.
Germany: Corona-Warn-App  
Source: Norton Rose Fulbright 2021; De Michele 2020
Who are the developers 
On 16 June 2020 the German federal government launched 
an official "Corona-Warn-App" app developed by SAP and 
Telekom for account of the German federal government.  
How it works 
Its functioning is similar to that of the others and is based 
on Bluetooth Low Energy technology, a technology for 
greater energy saving, which stores data on phones without 
transferring them to a central server. Germany has 
sacrificed the so-called "digital sovereignty" invoked by 
France and the United Kingdom and supports the 
technology proposed by Apple and Google for the 
coronavirus infection tracking app. Corona-Warn-App is 
based on contact tracking to protect of privacy (PEPP-IT). 
They are entirely open source, licensed by Apache 2.0. 
Corona-Warn is under development on the basis of the 
Exposure Notification Framework (ENF) provided by 
Apple and Google, which uses Bluetooth Low Energy 
technology (BLE). The app collects anonymous data from 
nearby cell phones using BLE. As soon as two users 
approach a distance of about two meters and remain at this 
distance for fifteen minutes or more, their apps exchange 
data via BLE. If a user tests positive for COVID-19, the 
user can enter the test result in his Corona-Warn app. The 
app then anonymously informs allcontactsstored. The data 
is stored locally on each device by preventing access and 
control over the data by the authorities or third parties. 
For the maintenance and development of its tracking app, 
Germany has invested around 3 million euros per month 
(Brady 2020).  
Data and privacy 
There are no major privacy concerns as Corona-Warn-App 
was designed with a focus on privacy from the very 
beginning. German data protection authorities generally 
support the Corona-Warn app and have only expressed 
small concerns, but less about the Corona-Warn app itself 
and rather about how it can be used: there are some 
concerns regarding intent from Apple and Google. The 
collected data will be automatically deleted after 14 days 
from the first entry. The voluntary aspect of the Crown-
Warn-App could be undermined through social or 
economic pressures that could be specifically applied by 
employers. It has been proposed that a special 
accompanying law (which has not been passed, only drafts 
from the opposition parties) is required to address these 
issues. The Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and 
Freedom of Information (Bundesbeauftragter für den 
Datenschutz und die Informationsfreiheit) has announced 
that the use of telephone registration is not an optimal 
solution because the complete anonymity of the user will 
no longer be guaranteed.
Ireland: Covid Tracker Ireland  
Source: Government of Ireland sd; Kelion Leo 2020 
Who are the developers 
We were unable to trace an official source regarding the 
government's decision to set up a tracking app, but we 
know that its launch took place in conjunction with the 
most European applications (Leo Kelion 2020). Developed 
by the company Neaform software, Covid Ireland Tracker 
application uses the API"ExposureNotification"developed 
by Apple and Google, which has been available in the latest 
iOS (iOS 13.5) and Android (6.0) update. NearForm, the 
software company that created COVID Tracker in 
collaboration with the Irish health authorities, to find out 
how they avoided the problems found in other contact-
tracing apps. NearForm was initially working on a 
centralized app to collect data to share with authorities, but 
it moved on to a more private and decentralized model after 
Google and Apple released new contact-tracing 
technologies for developers.  
How it works 
The company has employed a team to investigate the use 
of Bluetooth technology within the app. Like many other 
contact-tracing apps, COVID Tracker uses phones' 
Bluetooth to send signals and search for nearby devices 
that have the app installed. These signals allow you to 
create a contact log - if one of the users tests positive for 
the coronavirus, the Health Services Executive can 
download his log and notify all users with whom they have 
come into contact through the app itself. The use of 
Bluetooth has caused some problems, especially with 
regard to iPhones, which do not allow apps running in the 
background to send Bluetooth signals. The HSE then 
contacted Apple directly, and in a short time, both Apple 
and Google announced a new API specifically for contact-
tracing apps - basically, a standardized app model for 
developers to use. This new API has completely 
revolutionized the plans of the company. NearForm's app 
was based on a centralized model, which collects user data 
externally so that it can be analyzed by authorities. But 
Apple and Google were clear: in order to use their API, the 
authorities would have to employ a decentralized model, 
where all data remains within the single mobile device. 
 
 
This would have preserved the privacy of individual users, 
according to the two companies. The limitations of 
Bluetooth and the privacy issue made the HSE's decision 
to switch models very easy. Being able to share part of the 
technical burden with Apple and Google was certainly a 
positive aspect.  
Data and privacy 
The HSE highlighted how COVID Tracker is based on the 
decentralized model implemented by Apple and Google, 
such that the contact data will be stored and archived only 
on the user's terminal and not within a government server. 
“The decentralized model” declared the Institute: “allows 
to align the application to the privacy and public health 
principles outlined by the European Commission, the 
OECD, the WHO and the European center for disease 
prevention and control”. 
Italy: Immuni
Source: ANSA 2021; Barlassina 2020; Allievi 2020; Angius and Coluccini 2020c; 2020b; 2020a; Bandirali 2020; Barlassina 
2020; Berti, Longo, and Zanetti 2021; Camera dei Deputati 2021; Clarizia and Schneider 2020, De Michele 2020; 
Dipartimento per le Politiche Europee 2020; Erman 2020; Feroni 2021; HDblog.it 2020; Il Messaggero 2020; Il Post 2020; 
Immuni 2021; Jakala 2021; Janssen 2021; Marioni 2020; Melissari 2020; Menietti 2020; Ministero della Salute 2020; 
Ministero per l’innovazione tecnologica e la transizione digitale 2021; NTR 2021; Nuova Società 2020; O'Neill, Ryan-
Mosley, and Johnson 2020; Pezzali 2020; Rai 2020; Rociola 2020; Ruffino 2020; Salerno 2020; SoftMining 2021; Zunino 
2020  
From the idea of a tracing app to the contract and related 
public funding 
The idea of developing a contact tracing application takes 
shape on 23 March 2020, when the Minister of Economic 
Development, the Minister of Health and the Minister for 
Technological Innovation and Digitization launched a fast 
call for contribution, closed on March 26, 2020, aimed at 
private individuals, companies and organizations, aimed at 
identifying the best digital and technological solutions 
available for the "active" monitoring of the risk of contagion 
from COVID -19. 
On March 31, 2020, the Minister for Technological 
Innovation and Digitization appointed the "Data-driven 
working group for the COVID-19 emergency" with the aim 
of carrying out analysis and study of the impacts of the 
epidemiological phenomenon in progress, as well as to 
proceed quickly with the evaluation of the proposals 
formulated by the participants in the fast call, in order to 
select the most effective and suitable proposal to be 
implemented quickly at national level. 
Following the results of the assessments carried out by the 
Working Group and communicated to the Minister for 
Technological Innovation and Digitization, Paola Pisano, 
and from what was declared by the Research Institute on 
Public Administration (IRPA) in 2020, the solution of 
"Immuni", was considered the most effective and efficient in 
combating the virus both for compliance with the European 
model outlined by the Pan-European Privacy-Preserving 
Proximity Tracing Consortium (PEPP-PT Consortium) 
created by a group of 130 scientists and 32 companies and 
research institutes of 8 countries, including the ISI 
Foundation of Turin, on which France and Germany are 
converging, as well as for the guarantees it offers in respect 
of privacy.  
For this Bending Spoons SpA has been selected, among the 
more than 300 solutions proposed, by the task force of 74 
experts chosen in collaboration with the Ministry of Health 
to evaluate and propose technological solutions based on 
data analysis and address the health emergency. 
The proceedings continued, with ordinance no. 10/2020 of 
April 16, 2020 of the former extraordinary Commissioner for 
the implementation and coordination of the containment and 
contrast measures of the epidemiological emergency 
COVID-19, upon the signing of the open, free, perpetual and 
irrevocable license agreement of the source code and all 
application components. It also committed, again free of 
charge, to complete the software developments necessary for 
the activation of the national contact tracing service.
Who are the developers 
In Italy, the digital tracking system is being considered to 
contain and combat the epidemiological emergency COVID-
19 in the first half of 2020 because it can "help identify 
potentially infected individuals before symptoms emerge 
and, if conducted quickly enough, can prevent subsequent 
transmission from secondary cases." This is what we read on 
the ordinance of April 16, 2020 with which the former 
extraordinary Commissioner for the emergency Domenico 
Arcuri signed the contract with Bending Spoons. Bending 
Spoons, the creator company is Italian. Founded in 2013 by 
five partners, four Italians and one Danish, all under 30, it is 
number one in Europe for the development of iPhone apps 
and among the top ten in the world for downloads. Initially 
the headquarters was in Copenhagen, but in 2014 it was 
moved to Milan.  
How it works  
In general, a tracking app can be downloaded and used by 
any individual on their smartphone. The app creates a contact 
log in which there are three pieces of information: what 
device I have been in contact with, how far away, for how 
long. 
These three characteristics are usually typical of all tracking 
models since they contain the key factors to be able to 
identify where and when the potential contact occurred and 
to break the chain of transmission. If the individual is 
positive following a test, the medical operator authorized by 
the positive citizen, through the anonymous identification of 
the same, sends an input / alert message to inform all those 
users identified anonymously who have come into contact 
with him. On this aspect, doubts have often been raised 
regarding the confidentiality of such data and its 
management. However, their administration never seems to 
have presented critical issues given the encryption of the 
subjects, the automatic deletion of data every 14 days 
(complete reset as of 31 December 2020). In Italy, on the 
other hand, it was found that in some cases the application 
did not communicate with an alert the contact with a positive 
 
 
subject, therefore not making it known until the application 
was opened again, which often occurs sporadically, thus 
causing the proliferation of the virus to continue. Although 
this has happened to some individuals, most cases have not 
encountered this problem. 
Starting from February 25, 2021, with a provision of the 
Guarantor for the protection of personal data (change of 
reporting procedure), a new, more accurate and effective 
procedure for tracking data has been established. 
With the authorization of the Ministry of Health, the app 
allows a positive person to "self-report" i.e. to independently 
activate the alert procedure sent to close contacts. Up to that 
moment, in fact, a great critical issue of the local health 
systems had been the inability to proceed in this sense by 
having adequate structures and personnel to manage the 
reports. With the introduction of the new functionality, it will 
be possible to interact directly with the COVID-19 alert 
system (the definition can be found in the FAQ of the 
Immuni app) by entering, in the specific section of the 
Immuni app, the unique national code (Cun) attributed to the 
health card to its report of a successful COVID-19 diagnostic 
test, together with the last 8 digits of the health card. 
Data and privacy  
The Alert System, after verifying the data provided, enables 
the loading of temporary keys (so-called Tek) generated by 
the smartphone of the positive user, necessary to alert his 
close contacts. 
Once the Teks have been successfully loaded, the COVID-
19 alert system will invalidate the Cun code, in order to 
prevent further reports so as to avoid subsequent improper 
use (this is to avoid that the system can be polluted with false 
data and keep at the same time total privacy) 
The application consists of two parts. 
Contact tracking via Bluetooth: Bluetooth allows you to 
detect the proximity of two smartphones within one meter; 
the user will then be able to know if he has come into contact 
with a COVID-19 positive person. It will also be possible to 
retrace all the encounters of a positive person to track and 
isolate the potential infected: the app keeps a register with 
the anonymous identification codes of all the other 
smartphones in the vicinity of which you have been close; 
Clinical diary: contains all the most relevant personal 
information of the individual user (sex, age, previous 
illnesses, drugs taken, etc.). The user must take care to update 
the clinical diary daily with any symptoms and details on the 
state of health (the data of the clinical diary remain stored in 
their device so it is not possible to establish what portion of 
the population is able to provide correctly to update their data 
on the clinical diary). 
The framework of the Immune System therefore has three 
fundamental components to date:  
– the app installed on smartphones,  
– the national server located at the Ministry for 
Technological Innovation and Digital Transition,  
– the platform located across the Atlantic which, as we 
shall see, intervenes during the two delicate phases in 
which the procedure is carried out: the "ante alert" and 
the "post alert" of contagion risk. 
Public information and advertising campaigns on its use  
The campaign aims to: 
– promote the use of Immuni and contribute to the increase 
of downloads; 
– inform people about the functioning of Immuni, about its 
usefulness, safety, reliability; 
– promote a sense of personal responsibility and belonging 
to the national community. 
At the beginning of May 2020, when the alternative of the 
application was known, the Minister for Technological 
Innovation and Digitization Paola Pisano also announced a 
strong promotion with an advertising campaign on TV, 
press, radio and social networks.  
The campaign lasted 4 months, divided into three phases: the 
launch in June, a maintenance phase in July / August and 
early September, and the third recall phase at the start of 
autumn. 
The coordination of the campaign, both for creativity and for 
planning, was handled by Publicis Groupe, which made team 
and resources available completely free of charge, 
coordinating a real alliance between the media involving Rai, 
Mediaset, Sky, Apple, Google, Facebook, Mondadori, 
ItaliaOnline, Il Messaggero, RCS, Gedi Group, public 
figures, startups, companies.  
According to a Rai 3 report conducted by Enrico Lucci aired 
on October 27, 2020, most of the politicians of the parties at 
that time in the opposition considered themselves opposed to 
"Immuni" or simply claimed they would not have 
downloaded it, especially parliamentarians of the League 
and Brothers of Italy. The parliamentarians of the ruling 
coalition (MoVimento 5 stelle, Democratic Party, Liberi e 
Uguali, Italia Viva) and Forza Italia were, on the other hand, 
generally in favor. Some of them have shown that they have 
downloaded and activated it on their smartphone inviting 
everyone to do so. 
Usage data 
In total there were 9.9 million downloads for Immuni, 
including 7.3 for Android and 2.6 for iOS. However, the 
trend of downloads over time has been very irregular, as can 
be seen from the graph: until June 22, daily downloads have 
never been less than 80,000, and then dropped significantly 
and remained below 50,000 for the whole summer. In the 
first ten days of October, on the other hand, there was a rapid 
increase in downloads (over 200 thousand per day), before 
returning to drop and arrive - on November 22 - below 10 
thousand. These numbers are definitely below the minimum 
necessary in order to reach a satisfactory level of contact 
tracing coverage on the national population. 
Figure 5 - Immuni download trend, June-November 2020 
(seven-day moving average) 
 




Why has the Immuni app been implemented and not 
other apps? 
In order to better understand why the application created by 
Bending Spoons SpA was chosen, it was deemed appropriate 
to carry out a comparison between the winning Immuni 
application and the other alternatives on the market during 
the year 2020. In particular, among the different alternatives, 
four apps were identified for the analysis - Covid 
Community Alert, DiAry - Digital Arianna, Sm-COVID-19 
and StopCovid19 - and an identikit was built for each. As it 
can be seen in the appendix, in analogy to what was done for 
the Immuni app, three aspects have been the focus about the 
four alternative apps: the characteristics of the developers, 
the operating modes, the processing of data and the privacy. 
Covid Community Alert, DiAry - Digital Arianna, Sm-
COVID-19 and StopCovid19 have been selected by us, since 
the related official sources (websites) allowed a detailed 
comparison and analysis. To this end, please refer to the 
appendix. Regarding the question that we asked ourselves at 
the beginning of the paragraph, according to the Institute of 
Research on Public Administration (IRPA) and, as already 
explained at the beginning of paragraph 3, Immuni has been 
implemented because according to the "Working group 
given -driven for the COVID-19 emergency ”, appointed on 
31 March by the Minister for Technological Innovation and 
Digitization, the application complies with the provisions of 
the PEPP-PT Consortium and guarantees respect for privacy. 
That said, there are still elements of ambiguity regarding the 
procedure used. In fact, according to IRPA, Immuni does not 
seem to comply with all the criteria identified in the fast call. 
Furthermore, in the decree of the Extraordinary 
Commissioner for the COVID-19 emergency, no detail is 
indicated on the effectiveness of the chosen technological 
solution. According to government estimates, in fact, the 
tracking and contact app must be systematically used by at 
least 60%. Furthermore, there is no indication on compliance 
with the mapping minimization principle, or on the transfer 
of data, processed and, apparently, stored on a single 
ministerial server. Despite the critical issues identified 
above, it should be considered that there is no perfect app. In 
fact, the cost-benefit analysis regarding Italy found 
preferences towards a decentralized rather than centralized 
app architecture, a Bluetooth technology instead of GPS and 
without the support of big tech companies. 
Italy: the other main tracking apps  
Italia_Sm-COVID-19: the first Italian contact tracing app  
Source: SM-Covid-19 App 2021; SM-Covid-19 2021c; 2021b; 2021a; 2020; STOPcovid19 2021
Who are the developers  
The team is made up of a consortium of epidemiologists, 
engineers, data scientists, developers, lawyers, professors 
and researchers from numerous companies and institutions 
including, in addition to SoftMining, there are: Nexus TLC, 
MinervaS (TruckY), PushApp, TTPoint University of 
Salerno, Digital Magics, Apple Academy. The Sm-COVID-
19 app was developed without profit or for the acquisition of 
sensitive data (SM-Covid-19 2021b). 
Mode of operation  
SM-COVID-19 bases its operation on the ReCoVer protocol, 
a centralized protocol defined to achieve the following 
objectives: to 
– be used on a voluntary basis; 
– allow contact tracing; 
– guarantee the anonymity of the participants; 
– allow the reconstruction of the chains of contagion; 
– allow the calculation of a risk estimate, for each node 
connected to the network; 
– send notifications to devices connected to the network 
without knowing their identity; 
– allow the acquisition, on a voluntary basis, of location 
information without binding it to sensitive data; 
– prohibit the connection between devices for the exchange 
of keys or other information; 
– allow third-party apps to interact with the ReCoVer 
network; 
– allow the use of customized Beacon Layouts; 
– allow entities with the role of authority to be able to query 
coherent anonymized data (SM-Covid-19 2021a). 
In order to help health professionals in managing the 
pandemic crisis, the app transmits a specific code to the 
health authorities. More precisely, thanks to the use of 
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) wireless technology (SM-
Covid-19 2020) an anonymous beacon is emitted. This 
anonymously contains the individual user's 128-bit ID code. 
The generated IDs undergo a remote Claim procedure aimed 
at ensuring that the IDs have not already been used in the 
past. The remote Claim service guarantees two properties: 
– Atomicity: if two simultaneous calls to the Claim 
function contain the same universally unique identifier 
(UUID), one of the two is canceled; 
– Non-repeatability: a UUID is accepted by the Claim phase 
and is authorized if and only if it has not been previously 
accepted (SM-Covid-19 2021a). 
If the ID is declared unique it is authorized to be transmitted 
and the app receives a temporary authentication token. The 
first will allow access to the other services on the network 
during the lifetime of the random ID. Each device keeps 
track locally of all the unique identifiers it has managed to 
register. In the event that the Claim procedure fails, the 
device is forced to generate a new temporary ID in order to 
use the network services. The beacon can be intercepted by 
applications that are nearby, with subsequent estimation of 
the distance between the emitter and the receiver. For devices 
without BLE, but compatible only with standard Bluetooth 
technology, BT broadcast packets are emitted, according to 
pre-established time intervals, which can be intercepted by 
all devices using the Sm-COVID-19 application. Also, it is 
important to note that the app does not need GPS data in 
order to function properly. The user must have the ability to 
disable the tracking functionality. In fact, Sm-COVID-19 
provides the functions "outdoors" and "at home". The app 
can be authorized to automatically start tracking when it is 
detected that the user is outside a safe zone. 
Data and privacy 
The Firebase-Firestore framework (SM-Covid-19 App 2021; 
 
 
Firebase 2021) is used for data collection. The company 
SoftMining Srl also underlines that the data are anonymized 
at the time of their acquisition and processed by automated 
systems (machine learning, clustering and / or scientific 
applications) to extract recurring patterns and information 
related to their clustering (SM-Covid-19 2020). Regarding 
the possible GPS localization, the company affirms that only 
in case of explicit authorization by the user will the data 
relating to its geolocation be used. More precisely, these data 
can be used for the creation of Heatmaps and risk models and 
contagion trends. However, location data will only be 
recorded in the event that other users in the immediate 
vicinity are detected (SM-Covid-19 2020). 
Italy_Covid Community Alert 
Source: Corona Virus Outbreak 2021; Covid Community Alert 2020
Who are the developers 
The official homepage reports that the Covid Community 
Alert application has been developed by experts from all 
over the world. In fact, the Coronavirus Outbreak Control 
team is made up of 35 experts from six different countries 
(Corona Virus Outbreak 2021). It is also reported that some 
members of the team have worked in the past with 
internationally renowned partners, such as Airbnb, Google 
and Microsoft. The project leaders are: Luca Mastrostefano, 
Antonio Romano, Domenico Lupinetti, Carlo Martini 
(Covid Community Alert 2020). The team was formed on 
February 15, 2020 (Corona Virus Outbreak 2021). Three 
days later the collaboration with the National Research 
Council (CNR) and with the research team in Brazil began. 
On 8 and 16 April 2020 there was, respectively, the demo 
with the Brazilian Ministry of Health and the start of 
integration with IT services in Brazil. In Italy, the app is 
awaiting technical approval.  
How it works 
The application is compatible with both iOS and Android 
and is absolutely compliant with European directives. 
According to the homepage, the app allows anonymous 
monitoring by 38% more than traditional Bluetooth solutions 
(Corona Virus Outbreak 2021). The app is based on a 
worldwide open source standard and allows monitoring 
anonymously. The website emphasizes the international 
dimension of the application, since users' movements and 
travel abroad imply the need to have a worldwide protocol 
available that can adapt to all different scenarios. Each open 
source component - as well as the rules and messages 
established by virologists to identify people at risk - can be 
modified and adapted to the different regulations of different 
countries. 
It is important to distinguish between: 
– iPhone and Android user applications (CovidApp) 
– medical applications for iPhone and Android (CoviDoc). 
The keywords underlying Covid Community Alert are: 
– coverage: ability to anonymously monitor 91.2% to 
98.5% of all interactions between mobile phones (iPhone 
and Android), compared to 71.7% for traditional 
technologies; 
– interoperability: distribution of open-source SDKs 
(software development kits) that implement the 
anonymity protocol; 
– roaming: support for interoperability between nations 
that implement the open-source protocol. Experts are 
given the opportunity to establish rules and notifications 
to be sent to patients; 
– reaction speed: automatic contact of users. The 
notification can be sent directly from the laboratories 
where the swab is analyzed. The platform is also able to 
identify patients who have no symptoms (Corona Virus 
Outbreak 2021). 
Data and privacy 
IDs are anonymous and cannot be used to obtain personal 
data. Also, no login is required. There is no collection of 
sensitive data; the user's IP, in turn, is not saved. The 
application uses a technology that does not require GPS 
geolocation. All the product code needed for the service to 
function is open source and available online for review. 
Italy_StopCovid19 
Source: Barlassina 2020; STOPcovid19 2021
Who are the developers 
The project that led to the creation of the StopCovid19 app 
was created by Webtek completely free of charge 
(STOPcovid19 2021). According to Forbes, Webtek is a 
company founded in 2008 by Emanuele Piasini and his team 
of 30 people (Barlassina 2020). Before the pandemic, they 
were involved in communication and development of small 
software. 
How it works 
StopCovid19 keeps track of the movements of users and their 
contacts and is available for iOS and Android. The 
application uses the GPS signal to locate the device on which 
it is installed and to store data relating to movements. If 
necessary, the competent authorities may have access to the 
data, which will be automatically deleted after 30 days and 
cannot be used for commercial or other purposes 
(STOPcovid19 2021). The health authorities are able to get 
in touch with the affected user and know whether or not the 
user in question has been exposed to the infection. In case of 
need, the user can be promptly notified. 
Data and privacy 
The information collected by the application is accessible 
only to the competent authorities. No user can view the data, 
not even their own. It is possible to delete your user profile 
and all data recorded by the application, which will be 




Italy_DiAry - Digital Arianna  
Source: diAry - Digital Arianna 2021; University of Urbino 2021a
Who are the developers 
DiAry - Digital Arianna, whose name is a mix between the 
English word diary and the myth of the Minotaur, is 
developed without purpose of profit from the University of 
Urbino and DIGIT srl, a university spinoff, innovative srl 
and benefit company, with the voluntary contribution of 
civic hackers, developers and researchers (University of 
Urbino 2021a). 
How it works 
The application automatically detects the user's position and 
movements and stores it on their local memory (i.e. on the 
personal device). The user is granted the possibility of 
labeling all the places where he stops for at least 5 minutes, 
keeping memory of it (University of Urbino 2021a). 
Furthermore, the application is able to calculate the time 
spent in each place or on the move, recognizing whether the 
trips are on foot, by bicycle or by motor vehicle. The 
application allows the anonymous and voluntary transfer of 
daily statistics to a central database, thus contributing to the 
construction of an open data set. The user can also share the 
traces collected on his device and cross them with data of 
public utility (University of Urbino 2021a). The application 
calculates the following statistics every day: number of hours 
of application activation, percentage of time spent at home, 
total travel time, maximum distance from home, number of 
spontaneous annotations. The main system used is GPS, 
which, based on signals received from satellites, makes 
positioning errors of the order of 5 meters outdoors, but is 
less accurate inside buildings or in very narrow streets.  
It is possible to find the source code, freely available under 
the MIT license, on GitHub. 
The source of the mobile application diAry (Digital Arianna 
“diAry” [2020] 2020) is developed in Flutter, for Android 
and iOS. The data transfer back-end source (Digital Arianna 
“diAry” [2020] 2020) is developed in C # for .NET Core 3.1 
(diAry - Digital Arianna 2021). 
DiAry - Digital Arianna rewards responsible behavior, 
allowing you to collect at the end of the day a number of 
WOM, acronym for Worth One Minute, voucher for the 
recognition of social value (University of Urbino 2021a) 
proportional to the time of use of the app and time spent at 
home. WOMs can, in fact, be used as vouchers. Merchants 
and service providers can attribute value by granting 
discounts and concessions (University of Urbino 2021b). 
The aim is to contribute to social cohesion, attributing a 
value to the compliance with containment measures and 
offering a simple mechanism to link this act of responsibility 
to the economy of the territories involved. 
Data and privacy 
The application is completely open source. The specification 
and algorithms are public. The data are stored exclusively on 
the personal device of the user, who can freely decide to 
consult them, export them and possibly cross them with 
information of public utility. All collected statistics will be 
made available as open data. The WOM platform, used to 
recognize the social value of individual behaviors, is also an 
open source technology. No registration or account creation 
is required, as the data is stored on the user's personal device. 
There is no way to upload tracks to the network. The 
application only allows you to extract them in csv format to 
leave the user full freedom of use outside the app. The 
statistics collected daily do not allow to trace the person to 
whom they refer or his movements (University of Urbino 
2021a). 
New Zealand: NZ COVID Tracer  
Source: New Zealand Government 2021
Who are the developers 
NZ COVID Tracer is an app from the Ministry of Health. NZ 
COVID Tracer was developed for the Ministry of Health by 
New Zealand company Rush Digital and is based in part on 
the Amazon Web Services (AWS) platform. 
How it works 
The strategy adopted by New Zealand does not aim at 
coexistence with the virus, but at its elimination. It is a 
method that allows to reduce to zero the incidence of a 
disease in a certain geographical area. The ''zero covid '' road 
was adopted by the New Zealand government after an initial 
attempt to keep the curve under control through stringent 
strategies aimed at trying to control the number of infections. 
After a 5-week lockdown, the NZ went from a level 4 to a 
level 1 alert, declaring the pandemic over after 103 days 
without any positive cases. 
The NZ COVID Tracer app used by New Zealand is a kind 
of digital diary to help people track their movements. It can 
be used to: 
– scan QR codes to create a private digital diary of the 
places visited; 
– use Bluetooth tracking to keep an anonymous record of 
the people you have been close to; 
– record their contact details so that contact tracers can get 
in touch if necessary; 
– save your National Health Index (NHI) number to 
expedite the process if you need a test; 
– find the nearest test center and access other useful 
information. 
The Bluetooth trace allows you to receive an alert if you have 
been near another app user who tested positive for COVID-
19. It is safe, private and anonymous. Creating a private 
digital diary of the places you visit makes it easier to 
remember where you've been if needed. This way by 
scanning QR codes with the NZ COVID Tracer app you can 
receive a location alert if the same place is visited, at roughly 
the same time, by someone who later tests positive for 
COVID-19. The app will therefore only be used in the event 
that a person contracts the virus, so as to be able to easily 
reconstruct and report their movements. In addition, a solid 
system of isolation of positive cases was implemented in the 
country, which were transferred to hotels transformed into 
quarantine facilities.  
Data and Privacy 
An All-of-Government Cloud Services Agreement with 
AWS has been in effect since 2017. AWS services and 
 
 
infrastructure have been reviewed as part of the procurement 
process and are regularly tested against third-party warranty 
frameworks. Any information recorded by NZ COVID 
Tracer that you choose to share for contact tracing is 
encrypted before being sent to the Ministry via the AWS 
cloud services platform. The information you have chosen to 
share will be stored securely on the Ministry's servers on the 
Amazon web service hosted in Australia, and later deleted. 
The Ministry maintains control of the decryption keys. NZ 
COVID Tracer has also been evaluated by independent 
security experts to ensure your data is handled securely. NZ 
COVID Tracer has been approved by the Privacy 
Commissioner because it is designed to protect the privacy 
of all who use it. NZ COVID Tracer has also undergone 
independent safety testing. Any personal information and 
contact details you choose to register through NZ COVID 
Tracer are provided to the Ministry of Health so that contact 
tracers can contact you quickly if you are identified as a close 
contact of someone who has COVID-19. It is entirely your 
choice which information to provide - all information is 
optional, it will never be used for enforcement purposes. It 
will also not be shared with another government agency 
unless that agency is directly involved in the COVID-19 
response and information sharing is required for public 
health purposes during the pandemic.
Russia: Gosuslugi  
Source: ICT Moscow 2020; Norton Rose Fulbright 2021 
Who are the developers 
Russia has developed a smartphone app that alerts users to 
possible coronavirus exposure. The country's ministry of 
digital development, communications and media 
announced the app, tentatively titled "Stopcoronavirus", in 
mid-November 2020. The ministry said it had partnered 
with Moscow City Hall, as well as Apple and Google to 
develop the contact tracking app. The tech giants last 
spring collaborated on the development of exposure 
notifications now available in many countries including the 
European Union. The Ministry of Digital Development of 
the Russian Federation then launched at the end of 
November the real application "Gosuslugi. Covid Tracker" 
(on the App Store, Google Play) to keep track of contacts 
with coronavirus patients throughout Russia. Gosuslugi is 
a platform active since 2009 in Russia that we can consider 
as the site of the Russian public administration. 
How it works 
The contact tracing system is based on Bluetooth 
technology similar to that of public health authorities in 
other countries and its download is a voluntary decision. 
This application replaces a previous tracking model that is 
the one of tracking only the infected with a strict control of 
quarantines such as random "inspections" in which users 
were asked to show with a selfie that they are isolated at 
home. On this system there have been various criticisms 
about alleged high fines that arbitrarily arrived even to 
those who were not isolated. Now users diagnosed with 
COVID-19 must report it independently and anonymously 
via the app. In turn, users with whom this person has been 
close in the last 14 days will receive a notification with the 
date of the possible contact. To avoid false notifications 
(for example, a user who jokingly registers as sick), a 
person diagnosed with the coronavirus will have to enter a 
special code in the app, which will send notifications to 
people who have been in contact with them. These codes 
will be made available when a Russian resident tests 
positive for COVID-19. Once a user logs into the 
notification system, it generates a random ID for their iOS 
or Android device, which is then exchanged with 
surrounding phones via Bluetooth (in other words, the 
phone broadcasts the ID, while collecting the IDs of the 
devices around it). During the day, the device will 
download and check for random IDs linked to positive 
COVID-19 cases against its own list. In case there is a 
match, a notification is sent saying that you have been in 
contact with a COVID-19 patient and offers advice on how 
to proceed " 
Data and privacy 
The contact tracing app, which is based on developed 
technologies by Apple and Google, it's designed to track 
nearby mobile devices and alert you if they're within 10 
meters of someone diagnosed with COVID-19. Russian 
authorities have also promised not to use the app to collect 
personal information. Your phone scans your surroundings 
within a maximum range of 10 meters. All interactions are 
recorded anonymously on the device. The shorter the 
distance and the longer the interaction, the higher the risk 
estimate of infection by the app. The information is 
anonymous, the patient's identity is not disclosed. The data 
remains on the device and is automatically deleted after 14 
days. Apple and Google know ttolined as the technology 
does not use GPS, which means it does not track users' 
locations. The app is completely anonymous, without any 
connection to "Gosuslugi", otherwise the same companies 
would have allowed it to be used.
South Korea: Corona 100m-Corona maps  
Source: Lightning 2020; Zunino 2020; Shendruk 2020; Ribeiro 2020
Who are the developers 
We have not been able to find a reliable source with a 
precise date for the development and adoption of the 
Corona 100m-Corona maps app in Korea. The Corona 
100m app was developed by the Ministry of Interior and 
Security, with the collaboration of Bae Won-Seok, one of 
the creators of Corona 100m (Shendruk 2020). Lee Jun-
young is the developer of Corona Map (Ribeiro 2020). 
How it works 
Corona 100m crosses the user's geolocation data with 
public government databases, allows users, among other 
things, to see the date on which a patient has had the 
confirmation of positivity, as well as his nationality, the 
gender, age and its movements, and of course, as the name 
of the app implies, the distance from potential places at 
risk. When someone enters a radius of 100 meters from 
 
 
where a person registered as suffering from Coronavirus 
has passed, they receive a push notification. Coronamap 
allows you to track the movements of people registered as 
carriers of the virus. Users are informed of places visited 
by infected people, again in the area of one hundred 
meters. And always through this tool it is possible to 
notify the health authorities and thus trace the infected and 
exposed people. At that point, for those who do not yet 
have a diagnosis, quarantine, antigenic swabs and therapy 
are automatically disposed. The prerequisite for the 
operation of this system is the geolocation with Gps 
through the smartphone. 
Data and privacy 
The “Corona100m” government application crosses the 
user's geolocation data with those provided by the 
government, and was launched on 11 February 2020. 
Quarantined people are assigned to a government official 
who checks them twice a day. day by phone. However, 
they can, voluntarily, download the app and be tracked 
through it, as an alternative to checking via telephone. 
However, government officials are advised to use the 
app's results with discretion, considering that GPS data is 
not always reliable and accurate. The data that flow to the 
authorities allow not only to support the government's 
activities to combat the spread of the coronavirus, but also 
to constantly inform the population of these activities 
carried out by the authorities, and of the spread of the 
infection. Obviously, keeping the spread of the infection 
under control exactly means monitoring people. This is an 
approach that could be highly invasive of privacy. But it 
is a specific choice of the Korean authorities who consider 
it the only way to prevent the spread of the virus, without 
at the same time canceling the activities of an entire 
nation. There is no tracking of the entire population, but 
only of the subjects in quarantine (voluntary or forced) 
who decide to use the app. The use of the app is entirely 
voluntary (unlike in China), and is based on the consent of 
the individual, who may also not download or use it. The 
app also serves to keep in touch with healthcare 
professionals, as an alternative to the phone. The infected 
are interviewed, to verify their movements, and then the 
data are cross-referenced with those of government or 
private databases (surveillance cameras, credit card 
transactions, etc.), to collect information on their 
movements and to recreate the their paths (contact 
tracing). Then only the data about the places where a 
contact of the infected person with other people was 
possible (if the patient was without a mask) is disclosed to 
the public. In some cases, the name of a specific shop is 
also indicated (which leads to its closure). The authorities 
specify that they disclose only some of the data of the 
infected subjects. The dissemination of such data, 
however "anonymized", has created serious problems for 
some Koreans, who have been recognized by crossing the 
information, or simply because someone mistakenly 
believed to recognize them, thus defaming completely 
innocent people. Many people have complained on social 
media about such situations and the discriminatory 
consequences, asking to be left alone. Authorities said 
they intend to further limit the information disclosed. 
Despite the problems that have emerged, there seems to 
be a strong demand for more information (even a petition 
has been launched to get more information on the 
movements of the infected).
Spain: Covid Radar 
Source: Government of Spain 2021 
Who are the developers 
The contact tracing technology was developed with the help 
of Apple and Google as well and is very similar to the 
Immuni app in Italy, it was developed by Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Digital Transformation. 
How it works 
The application uses the terminal's Bluetooth connection, 
through which mobile phones emit and observe anonymous 
identifiers of other phones that change periodically. When 
two terminals have been close for 15 minutes or more, two 
meters or less apart, they both retain the anonymous 
identifier issued by the other. If a user is diagnosed positive 
for COVID-19 after undergoing a PCR test (a PCR test is the 
best way to ascertain a covid-19 infection. Through this test 
the results of a rapid test can be confirmed or it can be 
determined healing by decreeing the end of the quarantine 
period), they can decide whether to give their consent so that 
an anonymous notification can be sent through the health 
system. In this way, the mobile phones that had been in 
contact with the patient would receive a warning about the 
risk of possible infection and instructions on how to proceed 
would be provided. By not requesting data of any kind, it is 
impossible to identify or locate any user in any way. One 
contact tracking element is Exposure Notification - the use 
of digital privacy preservation technology to tell someone 
that they may have been exposed to the virus. The 
implementation of this function on devices has raised the 
usual wave of suspicion among users and citizens, raising 
doubts about the actual respect of privacy. Both companies 
argue, however, that these are simply functions designed so 
that each country's administrations don't have to build 
systems from scratch. 
Data and privacy 
Covid Radar tracks who you have been in contact with over 
the past 14 days via mobile devices. In this way, the 
developers assure, it is possible to determine whether the 
user has been exposed in full anonymity. The application 
follows the most guaranteed technical standards with user 
privacy in compliance with all the recommendations made 
by the European Commission in this regard. In this way, no 
user can be identified or located because there is no recorded 
data and because the whole process takes place on their 
phone without going to any server. Both the use of the app 
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